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Abstract
The debilitating effects of social dysfunction in many psychiatric disorders prompt the need for systems-level biomarkers
of social abilities that can be applied in clinical populations and longitudinal studies. A promising neuroimaging approach
is the animated shapes paradigm based on so-called Frith-Happe´ animations (FHAs) which trigger spontaneous mentalizing
with minimal cognitive demands. Here, we presented FHAs during functional magnetic resonance imaging to 46 subjects
and examined the specificity and sensitivity of the elicited social brain responses. Test–retest reliability was additionally as-
sessed in 28 subjects within a two-week interval. Specific responses to spontaneous mentalizing were observed in key areas
of the social brain with high sensitivity and independently from the variant low-level kinematics of the FHAs. Mentalizing-
specific responses were well replicable on the group level, suggesting good-to-excellent cross-sectional reliability [intraclass
correlation coefficients (ICCs): 0.40–0.99; dice overlap at Puncorr<0.001: 0.26–1.0]. Longitudinal reliability on the single-subject
level was more heterogeneous (ICCs of 0.40–0.79; dice overlap at Puncorr<0.001: 0.05–0.43). Posterior temporal sulcus activa-
tion was most reliable, including a robust differentiation between subjects across sessions (72% of voxels with ICC>0.40).
These findings encourage the use of FHAs in neuroimaging research across developmental stages and psychiatric condi-
tions, including the identification of biomarkers and pharmacological interventions.
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Introduction
Human mentalizing, also referred to as theory of mind (ToM),
includes the recognition of intentions and emotions of a social
partner, an ability which has convincingly been related to the
interaction of a circumscribed set of neural regions commonly
assigned to the ‘social brain’ (e.g. posterior superior temporal
sulcus [pSTS], dorsomedial pre-frontal cortex [dmPFC]; Adolphs,
2009). The in-depth characterization of this network with func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is a major goal of con-
temporary social and clinical neuroscience. This is reflected by
big-data consortia aiming at the identification of the neural
mechanisms of social cognition and associated behavioral def-
icits such as those observed in autism spectrum disorders (ASD;
e.g. EU-AIMS consortium; Murphy and Spooren, 2012). A critical
prerequisite for suitable neuroimaging biomarkers for develop-
mental and pharmacological research is the assessment of the
specificity, reliability and sensitivity of neural responses elicited
by mentalizing fMRI paradigms (Loth et al., 2015). However, des-
pite the broad recognition of these requirements (Bennett and
Miller, 2010) and the wealth of published fMRI tasks on mental-
izing functions (Schurz et al., 2014), no such data is available
to date.
Here, we developed an approach to provide systems-level
biomarkers of this kind using the so-called Frith-Happe´ anima-
tions (FHAs), a promising candidate tool for the assessment of
social brain activations across a broad range of developmental
ages and disorder severities. The FHAs are a set of validated
video clips depicting simple geometric shapes which interact at
different levels of social significance and prompt spontaneous
mentalizing functions (Abell et al., 2000). This form of mentaliz-
ing occurs automatically, is observable already at an early age,
and forms the basis of social functioning in everyday life (Mar
and Macrae, 2007; Apperly and Butterfill, 2009). The relevance of
spontaneous mentalizing abilities is exemplified by observa-
tions that ASD patients can learn to pass other mentalizing
tasks based on explicit reasoning, but have difficulties in spon-
taneous, i.e. more implicitly driven ToM (Frith, 2004; Senju et al.,
2009; Schneider et al., 2013). While the neural signals underlying
spontaneous mentalizing clearly map to the social brain
(Castelli et al., 2000), questions regarding the specificity and
quality criteria of FHA-induced brain responses remain to be
addressed.
The current study therefore investigates the specificity, reli-
ability and sensitivity of neural responses to the FHAs. Based on
previous evidence (Castelli et al., 2000), we hypothesized that
FHA-induced activation of the social brain can be robustly
reproduced in a well-powered sample. In order to address the
specificity of brain activation in the light of potential confounds,
we hypothesized that neural responses to the FHAs in higher
order social brain areas are specific to mentalizing processes
(as compared to sub-ordinate processes related to animacy and
agency perception) and unrelated to the low-level kinematic
properties of the animated video clips (Roux et al., 2013). Using a
test–retest approach, the reliability of neural responses was as-
sessed in order to inform the use of FHAs in different experi-
mental designs: While cross-sectional reliability is critical for
designs involving group comparisons, such as case-control
studies (e.g. in imaging genetics or pharmaco-fMRI studies with
parallels group designs), longitudinal reliability is required for
repeated measures analyses in developmental and cross-over
pharmacological designs (Bennett and Miller, 2010). A third type
of reliability refers to the aspect of between-subject reliability,
which reflects the replicability of between-subject differences
and is particularly desirable in endophenotype research
(Raemaekers et al., 2007). Since the ‘bottom up’-like nature of
spontaneous mentalizing is suggestive of a fairly stable re-
sponse of the underlying neural circuitry, we expected fair to
good (Shrout and Fleiss, 1979) reliability of FHA-induced brain
activations. In addition, statistical sensitivity was assessed as a
complementary measure and assumed to be high as a result
of the block design structure of the task.
Materials and methods
Experimental procedure
Participants. A total of 46 healthy volunteers (mean age: 24.7 6
5.3 years, 21 females) participated in the study, a subsample of
which (n ¼ 28, mean age: 22.96 2.8 years, 14 females) performed
fMRI scanning twice in order to assess test–retest reliability esti-
mates. Exclusion criteria included a lifetime history of neuro-
logical or psychiatric disorder, current intake of psychoactive
substances, significant general medical problems including
liver, cardiac, or renal dysfunctions, a history of head trauma,
and pregnancy. All individuals provided written informed con-
sent for a study protocol that was approved by the institutional
review board of the Medical Faculty Mannheim.
Paradigm. We integrated the FHAs (Abell et al., 2000) in a block-
designed fMRI paradigm with a pseudorandomized order of task
conditions [random (R), goal-directed (GD), ToM]. All video clips
featured a big and a little triangle moving about the screen. In
the ToM condition, the triangles’ movement patterns suggested
complex intentional interactions challenging the observer’s
mentalizing abilities (e.g. one triangle deceiving the other). In
the higher order control condition, the triangles interacted pur-
posefully, thereby conveying the perception of agency, but did
not challenge mentalizing functions (GD, e.g. one triangle imi-
tating the other). In the second, more basic control condition
(not analyzed further here), the triangles moved randomly with-
out interaction (R), thereby only allowing for the perception of
animacy. Following the procedures validated by (White et al.,
2011), we asked subjects to indicate the subjective social signifi-
cance level of the depicted interactions (i.e. ToM, GD or R) after
each video clip presentation (multiple-choice questions for cat-
egorization; MCQ-cat). After the social significance ratings of
ToM video clips, we additionally asked the subjects to rate the
perceived emotional state (i.e. positive, neutral or negative emo-
tional valence) of each triangle at the end of the video clip pres-
entation (multiple-choice question for the triangle’s feeling;
MCQ-feeling). This was done to assess the subjective emotional
significance of the scenes and to provide an indicator of
whether the expected social cognitive and emotional concept of
the displayed interactions had indeed been understood. Further
details on the stimuli, trial structure and ratings of the fMRI
paradigm are provided in Figure 1. Subjects were thoroughly in-
structed and trained prior to fMRI scanning using three estab-
lished practice video clips.
MRI data acquisition. Functional MRI was performed on a 3 T
Siemens Trio Scanner (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) equipped
with a 12-channel head coil. Functional data was collected
using an echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence with the following
parameters (TE: 30 ms, TR: 2 s, a: 80, matrix: 64  64, FOV: 192 
192 mm, in-plane resolution: 3  3 mm, slice thickness: 4 mm,
gap: 1 mm, 28 axial slices, 331 volumes).
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Test–retest procedures. Subjects participating in the test–retest
study performed all FHAs task procedures twice, including the
instructions and practice sessions (mean time interval between
the first [T1] and second [T2] session: 15.86 3.5 days). Basic vari-
ables such as time of day, hours of sleep, cigarettes smoked and
caffeine intake were matched as closely as possible between T1
and T2 in order to control for potential physiological confounds
(all P values> 0.05; Supplementary Table S1). In addition, scan-
ner quality assurance (QA) was performed according to an es-
tablished QA protocol (Plichta et al., 2012). Metrics pertaining to
mean signal intensity, spatial and temporal signal-to-noise
ratio, percent signal fluctuations and percent signal drift were
acquired on every measurement day (n ¼ 37), using the identical
EPI sequence parameters as outlined above for a total of 150 vol-
umes. Due to technical issues, QC data was not available for
four of the acquired measurements. All QA metrics were stable
within the time range of the study (December 2012 to May 2013;
Supplementary Table S2).
Spatial definition of social brain regions. A priori regions of interest
(ROI) were defined based on meta-analytical data highlighting
their well-established role in human mentalizing. To this end,
ROI masks were derived from a recent influential publication on
nonstory-based (i.e. non-verbal) ToM studies (Mar, 2011). The
masks delineated cortical regions including the dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex (dmPFC, bilateral mask size: 290 voxels), the
posterior aspects of the superior temporal sulcus region (pSTS,
left: 189 voxels, right: 227 voxels), precuneus (bilateral: 201 vox-
els), anterior middle temporal gyrus (aMTG; left: 75 voxels, right:
81 voxels), and inferior frontal gyrus (IFG, left: 84 voxels, right
104 voxels). Masks for the temporal poles (TP; left: 254, right: 391
voxels) were based on the Anatomical Automatic Labeling Atlas
(Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002). See Supplementary Figure S1 for
an illustration of the examined ROIs.
Data analysis
Functional correlates of spontaneous mentalizing. Image prepro-
cessing followed standard processing routines in SPM8 (http://
www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). Briefly, data was realigned to
the first image, slice time corrected, spatially normalized
into standard stereotactic space defined by the Montreal
Neurological Institute (MNI) template, resampled to 3 mm iso-
tropic voxels, and smoothed with an 8 mm full-width at half-
maximum Gaussian Kernel. Individual general linear models
(GLMs) included condition-wise regressors, which were calcu-
lated by convolving the modelled box-car functions of video
clip presentations with the standard canonical hemodynamic
response function (HRF) implemented in SPM. Realignment par-
ameters were included as covariates of no interest at the first
level. During model estimation, the data was high-pass filtered
with a cutoff of 256 s, and an autoregressive model of the first
order was applied. In order to separate the functional correlates
of mentalizing from those of lower-level processes related to
animacy and agency perception, the mentalizing condition
(ToM) was contrasted to the higher-level baseline condition
(GD). Resulting individual contrast images were subjected to
one-sample t-tests for group-level inference. Activations were
Fig. 1. Overview over stimuli and experimental design. (A) Stimuli consisted of three types of animated video clips with increasing levels of social significance, repre-
sented by three simplified icons during the subsequent categorization (MCQ-cat: ‘Which category did the previously presented animation belong to?’). Example video
clips are accessible at https://sites.google.com/site/utafrith/research. (B) ToM animations were additionally rated according to perceived emotionality (MCQ-feeling:
‘How did the little/big triangle feel at the end of the animation?’), which probed for the acquired concept of the displayed emotional states, and thus served as a rough
estimation of the subject’s understanding of the cover story: ‘coaxing’ and ‘surprising’ require both triangles to be rated similarly positively, while ‘mocking’ and
‘seducing’ require the little triangle to be rated more positively than the big triangle. Emotional states were represented by schematic faces with an unhappy, neutral
and happy expression, respectively. Bar graphs depict average rating scores (6SE) for each ToM animation, with ‘þ1’ referring to ‘happy’ and ‘1’ referring to
‘unhappy.’ Panel (C) depicts the temporal structure of a ToM trial. The presentation of the video clips was preceded by a jitter with variable duration (M ¼ 995.67 ms, s.
d. ¼ 418.3). Responses were given with the right thumb, using the left, upper and right key of an MRI compatible button box (Current Designs, PA, USA). As soon as
responses were given during MCQ ratings, the chosen icon was framed in red for the duration of one additional second, followed by a blank screen for the remainder of
the respective MCQ phase. No feedback on response accuracy was given.
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reported at a significance level of P< 0.05, peak-level family-
wise error corrected for multiple comparisons across the whole
brain.
Test–retest reliability. Test–retest reliability was determined for
the high-level contrast ToM>GD using the following comple-
mentary metrics (described in detail below and illustrated in
Figure 2):
1. Dice overlap of thresholded t-maps (Rombouts et al., 1998;
Smith et al., 2005),
2. Spatial reliability, defined as the replicability of the spatial
signal intensity distribution derived from contrast maps
(Raemaekers et al., 2007), and
3. Single-voxel reliability, defined as the replicability of single-
voxel signal intensities across subjects and time points
(Caceres et al., 2009).
Cross-sectional and longitudinal reliabilities resulted from
the application of the metrics ‘dice overlap’ and ‘spatial reliabil-
ity’ to group level and single-subject level activation maps, re-
spectively. Between-subject reliability was assessed using the
metric ‘single-voxel reliability’ in order to determine how well
the rank order of subjects is preserved across sessions. All three
metrics were applied to each ROI and to the whole-brain task
network (defined by voxels surviving P< 0.001 at the group level
at T1, uncorrected for multiple comparisons across the whole
brain; Figure 2D), and calculations were performed as follows:
The intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) with a consist-
ency criterion (ICC(3,1); Shrout and Fleiss, 1979) was used to as-
sess single-voxel and spatial reliability. Following Fleiss (1986),
we denote ICC values< 0.40 as poor, 0.40–0.75 as fair to good
and> 0.75 as excellent. Single-voxel reliability was calculated as
ICC on signal intensity across subjects and time points for each
voxel, and summary values were calculated as percent voxels
with ICC> 0.4 for each ROI. This measure therefore quantifies
the proportion of voxels which meet the reliability criterion for
each ROI. Spatial reliability was based on contrast maps and
was calculated as ICC on signal intensity across voxels and time
points. Finally, dice overlap was based on thresholded t-maps
calculated as ROVERLAP¼ 2*AOVERLAP/(A1þA2), which ranges from
0 (no overlap) to 1 (total overlap). The variables A1, A2 and
AOVERLAP represent the quantity of supra-threshold voxels at T1,
T2, and for both sessions, respectively. The overlap was eval-
uated for two thresholds, P< 0.001 and P< 0.005, uncorrected
for multiple comparisons across the whole brain, in order to
additionally assess the dependence of the overlap measure on
the applied threshold. A lack of supra-threshold activation was
penalized with assigning a value of zero. In addition, following
the assumption that single-subject level reliability should be
reflected in higher within- than between-subject overlap
(Gorgolewski et al., 2013), session-wise overlap measures were
Fig. 2. Schematic overview over the reliability analysis strategy, with A1/A2: number of supra-threshold voxels at T1/T2, Aoverlap: number of voxels with supra-thresh-
old activation at both T1 and T2, BMS: between-subjects mean square, EMS: error mean square, k: number of repeated sessions.
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computed between each subject and all other subjects and stat-
istically compared to within-subject overlap measures. To this
end, the within-subject overlap of each individual was com-
pared to a randomly chosen overlap measure involving the
same individual (i.e. between- and within-subject overlap), and
an average difference score was calculated. This comparison
was repeated 10 000 times. An empirical P value was calculated
as the number of occurrences with smaller within-subject over-
lap (i.e. difference score< 0), divided by the number of repeti-
tions. P values< 0.05 therefore reflect significantly higher
within- than between-subject overlap for the respective ROI.
Power calculations. In order to assess task sensitivity, i.e. the abil-
ity to detect an effect of task in the fMRI signal, power calcula-
tions were performed for each ROI separately as well as for all
ROIs combined using the FMRIpower toolbox implemented in
SPM (fmripower.org; Mumford and Nichols, 2008). Test sample
size was set at n ¼ 40, which has been shown to be adequate for
the unbiased detection of real effects in fMRI data (Yarkoni,
2009), and Type 1 error rate was set at a ¼ 0.05 for each ROI.
The resulting power estimates therefore indicate the probability
of detecting an effect at a statistical threshold of P ¼ 0.05 in a
future test sample of n ¼ 40 subjects. Consistent with the estab-
lished standards (Cohen, 1988), power values> 80% were con-
sidered as acceptable.
Effects of low-level kinematics. To identify and spatially localize
the neural effects of low-level kinematics, we used frame-wise
kinematic information (Roux et al., 2013) of the triangles’ phys-
ical movement properties, namely the ‘instantaneous velocity’
(defined separately for each triangle, Vlittle and Vbig) and the
‘relative distance’ (D) between the triangles. The frame-wise
kinematic regressors were i) down-sampled to 0.5 Hz (TR ¼ 2 s),
ii) z-transformed (mean 0 and s.d. 1), iii) convolved with the ca-
nonical HRF, iv) orthogonalized to the video clip regressors in
order to remove the main effect of the animations and v)
included as regressors of interest into the first-level (single-
subject) models. MCQ ratings were modelled as well to facilitate
comparisons against the implicit baseline. Parameter estima-
tion followed the same GLM procedure as described above.
Individual beta-images of each kinematic condition were subse-
quently subjected to a one-way analysis of variance for second-
level statistical inference. Kinematic-sensitive brain regions
were identified by testing voxel-wise beta values against the
null hypothesis (H0) of no increased response to any of the con-
ditions using the minimum statistic compared to the global null
(Nichols et al., 2005). To lower the risk of false negatives (i.e. fail-
ure to detect an effect of kinematics in mentalizing-associated
brain regions), significance was defined at a very liberal thresh-
old of P< 0.05, uncorrected for multiple comparisons across the
whole brain.
Results
Categorization performance
Mean overall categorization accuracy (calculated as percent cor-
rect) was 88.2 6 7.5% (ToM: 97.8 6 7.0%; GD: 75.0 6 14.7%; R: 91.8
6 14.8%). Emotional ratings of ToM video clips were consistently
positive for two animations (coaxing: 0.91 6 0.28 for the big and
0.81 6 0.54 for the little triangle; surprising: 0.80 6 0.59 for the
big and 0.93 6 0.33 for the little triangle), and neutral-to-
negative for the remaining two animations (mocking: 0.49
6 0.59 for the big and 0.10 6 0.85 for the little triangle;
seducing: 0.82 6 0.48 for the big and 0.11 6 0.93 for the
little triangle; Figure 1).
Given the lower categorization accuracy for GD videos, sup-
plemental analyses were conducted to explore the effects
of classification performance on mentalizing-specific brain acti-
vation (see Supplementary Material).
Whole-brain responses to spontaneous mentalizing
We detected significant activation increases during the mental-
izing condition ToM compared to the high-level baseline of GD
behavior in areas that were repeatedly highlighted in prior ToM
studies (for an overview, see Schurz et al., 2014) and overlapped
with the pre-defined social brain masks (see Table 1, Figure 3A).
These included pSTS, anterior STS and TP, dmPFC, IFG and pre-
cuneus. In addition, increased activations were observed in a
large cluster extending from the occipital lobe (including anter-
ior and posterior portions of the lateral occipital complex, LO1
and LO2) to the fusiform and inferior temporal gyri.
Test–retest reliability and power
While paired t-tests did not reveal any significant changes in
group-level brain activations from session 1 to session 2,
Table 1. Whole-brain activation during spontaneous mentalizing
compared to agency perception (ToM>GD)
Region k x y z t Pcorr
Medial temporal pole 1605 48 11 35 12.00 <0.001
Middle temporal gyrus 51 58 13 11.61 <0.001
Fusiform gyrus 42 46 17 9.58 <0.001
Superior temporal gyrus [Area
PFm (IPL)]
63 46 22 8.34 <0.001
Middle temporal gyrus 945 54 52 16 11.72 <0.001
Middle occipital gyrus [Area
PGp (IPL)]
39 79 28 9.53 <0.001
Inferior occipital gyrus [hOc4lp
(LO1)]
70 30 94 1 11.47 <0.001
Cerebellum [Lobule VIIa crus 2] 189 21 79 38 10.46 <0.001
Medial temporal pole 228 42 14 35 9.78 <0.001
Fusiform gyrus 217 42 49 20 9.21 <0.001
Inferior occipital gyrus [hOc4lp
(LO2)]
42 70 8 7.00 <0.001
Cerebellum [Lobule VIIa crus 1] 145 24 79 35 8.96 <0.001
Precuneus 170 3 55 43 8.8 <0.001
Middle occipital gyrus
[hOc4la(LO1)]
63 33 94 5 8.58 <0.001
IFG (pars orbitalis) 122 45 29 8 7.42 <0.001
IFG 69 57 29 7 6.99 <0.001
Middle frontal gyrus 51 42 8 52 6.88 <0.001
Superior medial frontal gyrus 84 3 50 34 6.65 0.001
Cerebellum [Lobule IX] 13 6 55 47 6.16 0.003
Supplementary motor area 15 9 14 67 6.01 0.004
Precentral gyrus 11 45 2 40 5.96 0.005
Parahippocampal gyrus
[Amygdala (LB)]
4 24 4 23 5.71 0.011
Note: Cluster extent k is given at Pcorr<0.05, family wise error corrected for mul-
tiple comparisons across the whole brain. Regions were classified according to
the Automated Anatomical Labeling Atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002). If ap-
plicable, anatomical labels were added in square brackets based on Anatomical
Probability Maps (Anatomy toolbox; Eickhoff et al., 2006). X-, y-, and z-coordin-
ates MNI and statistical information refer to the peak voxel(s) in the correspond-
ing cluster. P values are adjusted for family wise error correction for multiple
comparisons across the whole brain.
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reliabilities were heterogeneous across the different ROIs and
metrics (see Table 2, Figure 3 B–D). Highest values were obtained
for dice overlap and spatial reliability on the group level, indi-
cating high cross-sectional reliability across ROIs. On the single-
subject level, no ROI fell below the lower bound (0.40) of the
defined range of acceptable ICC values for spatial reliability (cal-
culated as the median of individual ICCs), suggesting that spa-
tial activation patterns are sufficiently reliable in a longitudinal
setting. Dice overlap for single-subject maps was more hetero-
geneous (maximum of 0.43 and 0.53 for the right pSTS at a
threshold defined at P< 0.001 and P< 0.005, respectively).
Despite this heterogeneity, the additional criterion of greater
within- than between-subject overlap was met by most ROIs.
Between-subject reliability as assessed as single-voxel reliabil-
ity was also heterogeneous across ROIs (overall mean of 34% re-
liable voxels). A reliable portion of at least 10% of voxels was
found for each ROI except for the precuneus. Larger portions
were found in the pSTS, right TP, right IFG and left aMTG (47%–
72%). Of note, the clustering of reliable voxels across the whole
brain did not stringently overlap with the activation (Figure 3 A
and B) or deactivation peaks (data not shown). Similar observa-
tions have been reported in previous reliability studies (Caceres
et al., 2009; Plichta et al., 2012). Power calculations revealed that
all ROIs performed well above the commonly adopted 80%
threshold (Cohen, 1988).
Differential responses to low-level kinematics
Effects of low-level kinematic stimulus properties were mainly
observed in areas of the dorsal visual pathway and the down-
stream oculomotor network (Goodale and Milner, 1992; Petit
and Haxby, 1999), including the motion-sensitive extrastriate
areas V3A and V5, superior parietal lobe (SPL) and frontal eye
fields (FEF; at the caudal end of the superior frontal sulcus;
Table 3 and Figure 4A). Visual comparison of whole-brain effects
of low-level kinematics to both pre-defined ROIs (Figure 4B) and
whole-brain observed (Figure 4C) mentalizing effects suggested
largely non-overlapping activation patterns (no overlap for all
social brain ROIs, below 6% for the T1 network at P< 0.05, uncor-
rected for multiple comparisons across the whole brain, see
panels B and C in Figure 4).
Discussion
The human social brain is the focus of many neuroimaging
studies dedicated to basic neuroscience and clinical research.
Given the high clinical relevance of social dysfunction and the
advance of large multicenter fMRI studies, empirical knowledge
on the quality criteria of social tasks becomes increasingly im-
portant. To this end, the current study investigated the specifi-
city, reliability and sensitivity of brain responses to the FHAs,
a well-established set of experimental stimuli arising from cog-
nitive psychology (Abell et al., 2000). Among others, we demon-
strate a strong differential engagement of key structures of the
human social brain to stimuli engaging mentalizing processes
relative to the high-level control stimuli challenging simple in-
tention detection. We hope that our findings, discussed in more
detail below, will be useful to guide the application of FHAs in
ongoing large-scale studies aiming at identifying the neural
mechanisms of normal and altered social cognition.
As our first main finding, we observed that the ToM video
clips provoked a strong activation increase in brain regions
that have been previously implicated in various aspects of
social cognition. While the strongest responses mapped to
Fig. 3. Functional activation (A) and reliability metrics (B–D) during spontaneous mentalizing (ToM) compared to agency perception (GD). Sections display thresholded
(A) T-maps and (B) ICC(3,1)-maps (i.e. single-voxel reliability). ROIs are outlined in red. (C) Spatial reliability of group activation maps is illustrated as scatter plots of
voxel-wise contrast estimates at session 1 (T1) and session 2 (T2). Voxels belonging to the respective ROI are highlighted in red. Dashed lines designate zero on each
axis. (D) Sections showing the overlap (in yellow) of whole-brain networks, defined at T1 (blue) and T2 (red) at a significance threshold of Puncorr<0.001.
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occipito-temporal areas involved in social perception (Allison
et al., 2000; Deen et al., 2015), the activations of the inferior par-
ietal lobule and IFG are consistent with the self-referential rep-
resentation of the observed actions (e.g. mirroring; Iacoboni and
Dapretto, 2006). In addition, the ToM animations recruited
structures known for subserving cognitive functions that allow
for the higher-order representation of complex social scenes,
such as perspective taking (precuneus; Cavanna and Trimble,
2006), abstract reasoning (dmPFC; Bzdok et al., 2013), and social
knowledge retrieval (TP; Olson et al., 2013). The observed
breadth of activations is hereby in line with current network ac-
counts on social cognition, which propose that specialized but
highly interrelated neural circuits operate on an implicit-
to-explicit continuum (Yang et al., 2015). Applied to our findings,
this framework would suggest that the strong engagement of
social-perceptive areas reflects the implicit bottom-up demands
Fig. 4. Whole-brain effects of low-level kinematic stimulus properties. (A) Sections displaying activated clusters. (B) Sections showing outlines of the pre-defined men-
talizing network (red), overlaid on whole-brain effects of low-level kinematics. (C) Outlines of the whole-brain effects of low-level kinematics are projected on sections
displaying whole-brain effects of mentalizing (ToM>GD). All statistical maps were thresholded at P<0.05, uncorrected for multiple comparisons across the whole
brain to minimize false negatives.
Table 3. Whole-brain activation to low-level kinematics
Region k x Y Z t Pcorr
Middle occipital gyrus [hOc4lp (LO2), hOc5 (V5/MT)] 575 45 79 13 6.19 <0.001
Superior occipital gyrus [hOc4d (V3A)] 21 88 40 2.34
Superior parietal lobule [Area 7A (SPL)] 1376 15 61 67 5.32 <0.001
Superior parietal lobule [Area 5L (SPL)] 18 55 67 4.11
Middle temporal gyrus [hOc4lp (LO2), hOc5 (V5/MT)] 262 45 73 7 5.08 <0.001
Lingual gyrus [hOc1 (V1), hOc2 (V2)] 68 9 91 8 3.70 <0.001
Precentral gyrus (FEF, BA 6) 327 24 13 58 3.61 <0.001
Superior frontal gyrus (FEF, BA 6) 370 21 10 55 3.22 <0.001
Cerebellum [Lobule VIIIa] 19 30 40 47 1.45 0.983
Cerebellum [Lobule VIIIa] 16 33 40 44 1.02 1.000
Rectal gyrus 4 9 47 20 0.97 1.000
Medial temporal pole 1 39 20 38 0.35 1.000
Note: Cluster extent k is given at P<0.05 (uncorrected for multiple comparisons across the whole brain), BA, Brodmann Area, FEF, frontal eye field. Regions were classi-
fied according to the Automated Anatomical Labeling Atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002). If applicable, anatomical labels were added in square brackets based on
Anatomical Probability Maps (Anatomy toolbox; Eickhoff et al., 2006). X-, y-, and z-coordinates MNI and statistical information refer to the peak voxel(s) in the corres-
ponding cluster. P values are adjusted for family wise error correction for multiple comparisons across the whole brain. Note that all clusters were identfied at a liberal
voxel-wise threshold of of P<0.05, uncorrected for multiple comparisons across the whole brain, in order to maximize sensitivity for potential confounding effects.
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of spontaneous mentalizing. Conversely, the engagement of
higher-order areas likely reflects the more explicit demands
of the stimuli, for example, those related to the evaluation and
rating of the ToM video clips (MCQ-cat, MCQ-feelings). We thus
conclude from these data that, albeit their minimal task de-
mands, the FHAs are suitable for challenging both bottom-up
sensory and higher-order representational areas and processes
in the social brain. Moreover, in contrast to purely passive tasks,
the implemented non-verbal ratings provide a form of behav-
ioral control during data acquisition (e.g. to secure that the sub-
jects indeed performed the task and understood the presented
social scenarios). For instance, the observed category ratings
imply that the subjects recognized the different levels of social
significance of the presented interaction. Of note, our supple-
mental analyses suggest that misclassifications can meaning-
fully explain activation within the mentalizing network (see
Supplementary Material). In addition, the valence ratings sug-
gest that the emotional significance (or leitmotif) of the cover
stories was generally understood, with a certain variability
across subjects that may point to (potentially clinically and
sub-clinically meaningful) differences in the acquisition of the
social emotional concepts of the animations. We expect these
behavioral measures to be very useful in future studies since
they may, for example, guide the identification of the neural
correlates of individual differences in subjective stimulus evalu-
ation and allow for the comparison of performance-adjusted
groups.
As a second study goal, we examined the functional correl-
ates of the low-level kinematics of the FHAs. Prior work identi-
fied kinematic differences in form of higher-immobilization
rate and lower relative distance of the animated shapes in the
ToM conditions, which related to differences in the eye-
movement towards the FHAs conditions (Roux et al., 2013). With
respect to neural network activation, our data suggests that the
predominant effect of the stimulus kinematics is rather local-
ized and is confined to the visuo-oculumotor circuitry (Petit and
Haxby, 1999). Notably, differences in the kinematic profile are
an inherent determinant of the social significance of the FHAs
(and plausibly also of natural social interactions) and are there-
fore not fully separable from the video clip conditions (Scholl
and Tremoulet, 2000; Roux et al., 2013). However, our results
suggest that their relevance to higher order social brain re-
sponses to the task are rather low. Importantly, the kinematic-
specific responses did not even overlap with the social
condition-specific effects within visual areas. The latter were
observed in the shape-selective area LO1 as well as in the mid-
fusiform gyrus, both representing higher order visual areas
involved in the detection of agency and social meaning (Shultz
and McCarthy, 2014; Malikovic et al., 2015).
Besides the specificity of the neural responses, we studied
the task’s capability to robustly activate the targeted system by
means of test–retest reliability assessments along with power
calculations of the elicited neural signals. In principle, a reliable
task allows the attribution of detected signals to factors other
than unstable task effects. The reproducibility of fMRI data can
be compromised by multiple factors, such as changes in acqui-
sition parameters (e.g. scanner hardware, field strength, image
signal-to-noise ratio) and subject-related factors (e.g. habitu-
ation, motion, cognitive strategies; Raemaekers et al., 2007;
Caceres et al., 2009; Bennett and Miller, 2010; Gorgolewski et al.,
2013). Prior studies have assessed the reliability of brain re-
sponses in various domains, including emotion and motivation
(e.g. Johnstone et al., 2005; Plichta et al., 2012, 2014; Lipp et al.,
2014), executive (e.g. Caceres et al., 2009; Plichta et al., 2012) and
sensorimotor functions (e.g. Zandbelt et al., 2008; Caceres et al.,
2009), but not for mentalizing tasks targeting the social brain.
Notably, unlike many prior reliability studies, we specifically
focused on the robustness of the high-level experimental con-
trast, controlled for a range of basic physiological confounds,
and aimed at maximizing the generalizability of results by con-
straining our analysis to a set of meta-analytically derived ROIs.
We applied two different metrics, dice overlap and spatial
reliability, to the group- and single-subject data in order to
quantify aspects of cross-sectional and longitudinal reliability,
respectively. These analyses revealed good-to-excellent reliabil-
ity of group-level responses to FHAs across ROIs and metrics,
which is in line with the observation of a generally high repro-
ducibility of other robust fMRI paradigms studied cross-
sectionally (Plichta et al., 2012). Longitudinal reliability was
lower, in particular for the spatial overlap measure, although
the criterion of greater within- than between-overlap of supra-
threshold activation (Gorgolewski et al., 2013) within pre-
defined ROIs was met by most areas of the social brain. Spatial
reliability was fair-to-good for all ROIs, and even excellent for
the right pSTS. These results are in line with previous reports of
lower reliability of fMRI results obtained on the single-subject
compared to the group level (Raemaekers et al., 2007; Plichta
et al., 2012; Lipp et al., 2014).
Across ROIs, the overall reliability pattern suggests that
activity was less reproducible in areas linked to higher-order
cognitive processes, such as meta-cognition and self-reflection
(e.g. dmPFC, precuneus; Cavanna and Trimble, 2006; Bzdok
et al., 2013). A plausible reason for this observation is the fact
that the triangle animations allow for a certain degree of ‘cogni-
tive freedom’ (Gorgolewski et al., 2013) since they allow to be in-
terpreted differently by different subjects and might therefore
be associated with a greater variability of neural responses. The
reliability of the pSTS, in contrast, was excellent across levels
(i.e. single-subject and group level) and metrics (i.e. spatial reli-
ability and dice overlap), which is in line with this region’s in-
volvement in more implicit, bottom-up and thus possibly more
invariant processes linked to social perception (Deen et al.,
2015). The repeated exposure of FHAs stimuli within a two-
week interval might therefore not influence bottom-up proc-
esses responsible for triggering spontaneous mentalizing, but
may have an impact on how the videos are interpreted upon se-
cond presentation (e.g. no need for a de-novo reconstruction
of the presented social scenario). In more general terms, our
finding of different reliabilities across ROIs likely reflects the dif-
ference between more constrained bottom-up and more flexible
top-down processing of social information.
The right pSTS also yielded the best differentiation between
subjects, with more than 70% of voxels displaying at least fair-
to-good between-subject reliability (i.e. single-voxel reliability
with ICC(3,1)> 0.40). Since greater heterogeneity between sub-
jects leads to higher ICC values, our results suggest that pSTS
activity, besides being highly consistent across sessions, is suffi-
ciently heterogeneous across subjects and is thus particularly
suitable for endophenotype research (Raemaekers et al., 2007).
Besides test–retest reliability, statistical sensitivity was as-
sessed using power calculations for a future test sample of 40
subjects. Here, all key regions of the social brain showed a very
good probability to detect a functional effect while keeping
the type I error rate below 5%. The good statistical sensitivity may
be a consequence of the bottom-up driven processes of FHAs, but
also the robust block structure of the task and the higher signal-
to-noise ratios which result from the chosen voxel size (Bennett
and Miller, 2010) and smoothing kernel (Caceres et al., 2009).
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Following the systems biology approach, the aim of task-
based fMRI in biomarker research is to access specific functional
networks with sufficient reliability and sensitivity in order to
identify markers of normal or pathogenic processes or of treat-
ment response (Biomarkers Definitions Working Group, 2001).
While the obtained fMRI phenotypes may, to some extent, be
specific for the employed task (e.g. spontaneous mentalizing vs.
false-belief reasoning) and associated behavior, they reflect the
interplay of large-scale and oftentimes overlapping neural cir-
cuitries. Aberrant activation patterns in patient groups can
therefore point to a disruption of information processing within
or between these networks. According to this rationale, we
believe that our neuroimaging findings support the following
conclusions and recommendations for biomarker research on
human mentalizing processes:
1. The FHAs lead to a relatively specific activation of social
brain areas including networks involved in social percep-
tion, action observation and ToM. The high-level contrast of
the task allows for the separation of effects of mentalizing
from those related to simple intention attribution. Although
the observed condition-dependent differences in activation
appear to be mainly quantitative, qualitative differences
might emerge in clinical populations such as patients with
ASD (Castelli et al., 2002).
2. Within our fMRI paradigm and the associated data acquisi-
tion and analysis procedures, the FHAs allow for a reliable
characterization of social brain activations in cross-
sectional and—to a certain extent—also longitudinal study
designs. These stimuli therefore represent a promising
means to identify and stratify imaging biomarkers and val-
idate pharmacological interventions (Loth et al., 2015), al-
though their use in clinical populations additionally
requires to demonstrate reliably altered brain responses
in these samples.
3. The pSTS additionally demonstrated high between-subject
reliability and is therefore particularly suited for tracing neu-
ral correlates of inter-individual differences, such as
learning-related differences or potential genetically influ-
enced neural traits (Raemaekers et al., 2007). For instance,
the repeated observation of pSTS dysfunctions in highly her-
itable disorders such as ASD (e.g. Zilbovicius et al., 2006) sup-
ports the proposed value of this region for genetic research.
Finally, the specific and reliable brain responses to FHAs en-
courage the evaluation and use of this task for the characteriza-
tion of mentalizing-specific functional connectivity differences
in clinical research. We expect this line of research to offer in-
sights into preserved and altered human social brain network
dynamics in health and disorders with prominent social dys-
function such as schizophrenia and autism.
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